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The right of withdrawal was introduced to European consumer law as an exception to the general contractual principle of pacta sunt servanda. It has recently been upheld in the Consumer Rights Directive as a mandatory right for consumers concluding distance selling contracts. Among various assessments of this measure a comprehensive evaluation thereof from the point of view of consumers’ interests is lacking. Such an assessment is conducted in this paper with consideration of the effect that the right of withdrawal is likely to have on consumers. The yardstick for the evaluation of the current rules, as well as for suggesting a new approach is the increased consumer welfare, which takes into account consumers’ happiness and their lack of regret for entering into transactions.
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1.	Introduction
The right of withdrawal was introduced to European consumer law as an exception to the general contractual principle that once a contract is concluded it binds its parties (pacta sunt servanda). In opposition to this principle, the right of withdrawal enables consumers to cancel a concluded contract for any reason, without any penalty, within a certain period of time (Loos 2007, pp. 5-6; Loos 2009, p. 241; Rott and Terryn 2010, p. 239; Twigg-Flesner and Schulze 2010, p. 145). Such a far-going right was meant to strengthen consumer protection, mostly by shielding consumers from the consequences of their irrational decision-making (Borges and Irlenbusch 2007, pp. 84-85; Loos 2009, p. 239; Twigg-Flesner and Schulze 2010, p. 145). As such, the right of withdrawal applies only to certain specific consumer transactions, which are particularly prone to enable traders’ exploitation of consumers’ vulnerabilities. One of them is a distance selling transaction, in which a trader and a consumer have no opportunity to meet each other and to discuss in person contractual terms or the qualities of the offered goods or services. On the European level, the mandatory right of withdrawal was introduced to distance selling contracts in the Distance Selling Directive​[1]​, which will soon be replaced by the Consumer Rights Directive.​[2]​​[3]​
This paper assesses whether the European Union’s decision to maintain in the Consumer Rights Directive a mandatory right of withdrawal in consumer distance selling contracts lies in the consumers’ best interests. The assessment is conducted with consideration of the effect that the right of withdrawal is likely to have on consumers, taking into account consumer psychology research. The yardstick for the current rules’ evaluation, as well as for suggesting a new approach is the increased consumer welfare, determined through findings on what contributes to consumers’ happiness and what lets them avoid feelings of regret with respect to concluded transactions. While it is impossible to precisely measure such an effect, it is feasible to draw general conclusions and to estimate the right of withdrawal’s overall effect on the consumer welfare. 
Until now, publications questioning the purpose and the proper functioning of the mandatory right of withdrawal in consumer law did not focus on assessing this right through consumer psychology findings but rather took into account the behavioural economics’ perspective (e.g., Ben-Shahar and Posner 2011, p. 116; Eidenmüller 2011, pp. 2-3; Rekaiti and van den Bergh 2000, p. 372). As a result, they discussed this right’s efficiency by comparing this instrument’s costs and benefits for transaction’s participants, while deviating from traditional, rational economics by taking into account consumers’ irrationalities. This paper also draws on the research concerning consumers’ rationality, but this paper’s scope goes beyond the economic considerations, focusing instead on consumers welfare and how it could be influenced by the right of withdrawal in distance selling contracts. 
First, I present reasons used to justify the introduction of the mandatory right of withdrawal in consumer distance selling contracts, while immediately evaluating their validity from a perspective of consumer psychology (second chapter). Then, I discuss possible behavioural effects of the right of withdrawal on consumers that could undermine this right’s retention in European consumer distance sales law due to a possibility of consumers’ unhappiness and feelings of regret associated with the right of withdrawal’s use (third chapter). Simultaneously, I assess the influence of current developments pertaining to the right of withdrawal, i.e., a trend to prolong and unify the right of withdrawal, on consumer welfare. Finally, I answer the question whether the right of withdrawal in consumer distance sales should be maintained as a mandatory European right and what other options could be considered by the European legislator (fourth and fifth chapter).
Consumer psychology research is often perceived as ambiguous and indecisive. Indeed, it may be difficult to draft any policy changes based on its findings alone. However, taking consumer psychology research into consideration should be at the top of the policymakers’ agenda. After all, behavioural research has indicated the nature of the predominant trends and behavioural phenomena in the real world. Even if the policymakers want to change the existing behavioural trends or prioritise other, e.g., moral, interests, this should be done with a reference to the existing status quo. Therefore, this article calls upon researchers to conduct more empirical studies focused specifically on the right of withdrawal’s influence on consumer behaviour.
2.	Behavioural Assumptions Underlying the Right of Withdrawal
The introduction of the mandatory right of withdrawal in distance selling contracts in Europe was supposed to encourage consumers to conclude more long-distance transactions (Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar 2012, p. 19; Ben-Shahar and Posner 2011, p. 119; Loos 2007, pp. 9-10, 28; Loos 2009, pp. 245-246).​[4]​ The increase of concluded distance cross-border transactions could strengthen and unify the currently divided European internal market (Eidenmüller 2011, p. 6; European Commission September 2006, p.2; European Commission October 2008, p. 2). This chapter examines the European legislator’s assumption that the European consumer will be more encouraged to conclude a distance selling contract if he has the right of withdrawal’s assurance (Loos 2009, pp. 247-248).
First, I introduce the efficiency argument that often takes the foremost place in the right of withdrawal’s assessment. However, instead of conducting a straightforward analysis of this instrument’s costs and benefits in a distance selling transaction, I broaden the scope of the efficiency’s assessment by looking at both: the anticipated and the post-decision levels of consumers’ regret. 
Subsequently, I present a right of withdrawal as a cooling-off instrument, which allows consumers to control their emotions and assess more objectively the transaction they had concluded. It could be claimed that consumers would be more willing to enter into transactions if they knew they could correct any impulsively made and then regretted decisions. Even though this argument is not usually made with respect to distance selling transactions, I believe, it has also some relevance here. 
Not only consumer’s emotions, but also his cognitive errors may negatively influence a decision whether to conclude a distance selling contract. Again, the right of withdrawal could be seen as encouraging consumers to conclude more transactions, since it allows them to withdraw from any irrational contractual decision that they regret. This argument will be presented in the third sub-chapter. 
Finally, consumers could be discouraged from concluding distance selling contracts due to uncertainty and lack of trust in either the trader or the goods and services he was offering. The last sub-chapter considers, therefore, whether the right of withdrawal could increase consumers’ confidence and trust in the success of a distance selling transaction and minimise their regret from concluding it.
2.1.	Efficiency Rationale
Consumers are less likely to conclude contracts when they do not know how much they will value goods or services they could receive (Ben-Shahar and Posner 2011, p. 116, 121; Hansen 2005, p. 420; Harridge-March 2006, p. 748; Loos 2007, p. 10; Loos 2009, p. 247). Policymakers seem to accept that consumers need to take certain risks when they proceed with a purchase, regardless of the method of obtaining goods (Hansen 2005, p. 421). That being said there is an important difference between direct and distance selling contracts, since contrary to direct selling the character of the latter transactions hinders the consumers’ capability to determine the goods’ value through inspection prior to contract’s conclusion (Borges and Irlenbusch 2007, p. 85; Eidenmüller 2011, pp. 8-9; Rekaiti and van den Bergh 2000, p. 380). While consumers are unable to even briefly look at the goods or try them out in order to estimate their value, they may have more doubts about the contract’s conclusion. If consumers feel anticipated regret even before the transaction is made it could incline them to postpone the decision-making and to spend more time and effort on trying to determine the transaction’s value that, often, would be impossible to be determined (Schwartz 2004, pp. 147-148). By granting consumers the mandatory right of withdrawal, the European legislator ensured that consumers obtained a chance try the goods out upon their receipt in order to assess their value, so as to make an informed decision whether to stay bound by the transaction (Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar 2012, pp. 17-19; Ben-Shahar and Posner 2011, p. 116, 121; Scott and Triantis 2004, pp. 1430-1431). The right of withdrawal should, therefore, give consumers an extra incentive to participate in distance selling by lowering transactions’ risks and by decreasing any potential feelings of post-decision regret. Additionally, it should eliminate any ‘market for lemons’ effect (Akerlof 1970, p. 488; Eidenmüller 2011, pp. 7-9; Rekaiti and van den Bergh 2000, p. 380) since if a consumer knew that he could withdraw from a transaction if he was not satisfied with the received goods’ value, he should not have a problem with paying a higher price for a supposedly higher quality goods (Eidenmüller 2011, p. 9). 
It is undisputed that the consumer’s knowledge about goods and their real value to him should increase with time and with more opportunities to test such goods (Ben-Shahar and Posner 2011, p. 121). Therefore, the right of withdrawal’s effect – taking away the consumers’ disincentive to conclude transactions upon learning the goods’ true value – could be greater, if consumers were given an option of an unlimited goods’ use in the cooling-off period. Even if this would put consumers purchasing goods through a distance sale at an advantage in comparison with direct shopping consumers, this could be justified by the European legislator wanting to raise attractiveness of cross-border transactions for consumers.​[5]​ Instead, the Distance Selling Directive provided European consumers with seven working days to decide whether they wanted to uphold the distance selling contract from the day of the goods’ receipt or the day of the contract’s conclusion in case of purchase of services (Loos 2007, pp. 14-15; Loos 2009, p. 268; Rott and Terryn 2010, pp. 274-275).​[6]​ The new Consumer Rights Directive prolonged this period to fourteen calendar days. On the one hand, the change from calculation of this period in working days to calendar days increases legal certainty. A consumer does not need to consider anymore what, if any, public holidays may fall within this period in a country he purchased the goods from. On the other hand, the European legislator decided to prolong the cooling-off period by a few days. Pursuant to the efficiency argument, the cooling-off period’s length should be sufficient for a consumer to determine the goods’ value and to confirm he would not regret the transaction. I have not found any empirical evidence supporting the thesis that the cooling-off period’s prolongation has been made due to the inefficiency of the current seven working days (or, usually, nine calendar days) cooling-off period. The reasons that have been given to justify the cooling-off period’s prolongation concern more the need to unify the right of withdrawal among different types of contracts (Loos 2009, pp. 242-244).​[7]​ 
Traders could be compensated for the opportunity granted to consumers to use the goods in the cooling-off period, as long as the compensation’s amount did not discourage consumers from exercising their right of withdrawal (Eidenmüller 2011, p. 21). The Distance Selling Directive did not contain a provision establishing such a right to compensation for the goods’ use. This led to divergence among the consumer protection rules in various Member States. In order to harmonise this matter, specific provisions about the compensation for the goods’ use have been added to the Consumer Rights Directive. A consumer will be liable for any diminished goods’ value that will result from more than just establishing their nature, characteristics and function.​[8]​ This obligation does not bind a consumer if he was not informed about his right of withdrawal. The European legislator assumed that the right of withdrawal’s function is to enable the consumer to familiarize himself with the goods’ nature, characteristics and function. This new provision supports the general view expressed by the Court of Justice that traders may not demand compensation for the goods’ use during the cooling-off period, since that could act as a barrier for consumers to either use their right of withdrawal or to try to establish the goods’ real value.​[9]​ However, as the Court of Justice states, the consumers’ right of withdrawal does not stand in the way of them compensating traders for such a goods’ use that goes against the principles of civil law, good faith and unjust enrichment.​[10]​ The burden of proof that a consumer used the goods in such a manner would rest on the trader.​[11]​ It is unlikely that a simple test or goods’ examination, e.g., switching on a delivered computer and installing any software on it, could be required to be compensated for. After all, the right of withdrawal’s function is to grant consumers the same possibility to test the goods as if they were in a shop in order to determine their value.​[12]​ However, if consumers are given a possibility to use their right many days after the goods’ delivery, they may use the goods for more time than what will be necessary to determine their value. Such a possibility enables an opportunistic behaviour of consumers (Eidenmüller 2011, p. 21). In that respect, reclassification of compensation not as a ‘compensation for use’ but rather in the sense of ‘compensation for deterioration’ of goods that took place in the Consumer Rights Directive could simplify certain issues, but not all of them (Ben-Shahar and Posner 2011, p. 116; Twigg-Flesner and Schulze 2010, p. 156).​[13]​ It may be difficult to determine precise depreciation in goods as a result of their use during the cooling-off period. Certain goods would also be instantly depreciated upon a consumer opening the packaging (Ben-Shahar and Posner 2011, p. 121-122, 136, 138).​[14]​ 
Two issues related to the introduction of an obligation to compensate traders for the goods’ diminished value need to be mentioned. First, it could undermine the right of withdrawal’s purpose of facilitating distance selling transactions, if consumers were not willing to use the goods during the cooling-off period knowing they would have to pay for it. Consumers could prefer to guess the transaction’s value and to suffer a potential loss and regret as a result of poor judgment rather than bearing certain, specific costs for the goods’ use (Twigg-Flesner and Schulze 2010, p. 156).​[15]​ This could lead to the ‘market of lemons’ effect (Akerlof 1970, p. 488; Eidenmüller 2011, pp. 7-9; Rekaiti and van den Bergh 2000, p. 380) or consumers’ lack of participation in the cross-border distance selling transactions. Additionally, if the compensation’s amount depended on the amount of time that the goods were in consumers’ possession, it could nudge consumers to hurry with their decision-making. This, again, would be counterproductive to the right of withdrawal’s aim: providing consumers with sufficient time to estimate the goods’ value and not to regret their decisions. Consumer psychology research has shown that if consumers need to make decisions under severe time pressure, they are likely to change their decision-making strategies and evaluate the products from a different perspective and on the basis of different characteristics than what they would normally choose for (Bettman et al. 1998, p. 200). For example, consumers may then try to obtain some information on many different characteristics of the goods, instead of evaluating a few, most important characteristics in-depth. Additionally, research showed that if consumers are under time pressure they could be more likely to focus on negative information (Wright 1974, p. 560).
While some of the arguments presented in this part support the introduction of the mandatory right of withdrawal in distance selling contracts, it seems that the specific regulation thereof is at the moment not based on empirical evidence justifying the introduced measures, e.g., with regards to the cooling-off period’s length or a compensation method for the goods’ use during the cooling-off period. Therefore, the efficiency goals that should be achieved could, in fact, be undermined by the current regulations. To assure the right of withdrawal’s efficiency, its cost would have to be lower than the benefit acquired from selling high quality goods for a higher price (Eidenmüller 2011, p. 9). If this right’s cost could be kept low, it could be expected that many traders would be willing to voluntarily provide consumers with the right of withdrawal and the mandatory nature thereof would be superfluous (Eidenmüller 2011, p. 10). However, traders have other means of signalling to consumers that the goods’ quality is high and that consumers will not regret concluding a contract, e.g., by relying on word-of-mouth, by maintaining a certain reputation, or by providing quality warranties (Harridge-March 2006, p. 748; Rekaiti and van den Bergh 2000, p. 380). It could, therefore, not be guaranteed that every trader would provide his consumers with a right of withdrawal if it did not have a mandatory nature.
2.2.	Cooling-off Period
Consumer psychology studies suggest that if people make purchase decisions under an influence of fleeting emotions, they are more likely to pay too much and later regret their purchase (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, pp. 28-29). If these findings apply to distance selling, such emotions could discourage consumers who ventured into these transactions from repeating the experience. Therefore, aside of providing consumers with an opportunity to determine the goods’ value, the cooling-off period allows consumers to calm down, and soberly consider all pros and cons of taking a transactional decision (Loos 2007, p. 6; Rott and Terryn 2010, p. 240).
Varied behavioural research claimed that frequently when consumers are convinced that they are making a rational decision, instead they are being led by emotions of the moment (Camerer et al. 2003, p. 1238; Loewenstein 2000, p. 428; Sunstein and Thaler 2003, p. 29). Such a discrepancy could be explained by consumers’ lack of self-control, a certain ‘temporary madness’ (Loewenstein 2000, p. 430; Rekaiti and van den Bergh 2000, p. 372), due to which consumers often show instability in their preferences during a relatively short amount of time (Rekaiti and van den Bergh 2000, p. 375). One day they will consider a good particularly valuable, while the next they may not value it at all. From this perspective, it does not surprise that consumers may need that extra cooling-off time to consider all advantages and disadvantages of a decision to conclude a contract. 
There is no empirical evidence to suggest that consumers concluding distance selling contracts are more susceptible to their emotions than consumers purchasing goods or services in a store. However, it is possible that consumer protection was broadened in distance selling contracts through the right of withdrawal’s introduction in order to promote conclusion of such contracts also by consumers who are susceptible to emotional decision-making (Ben-Shahar and Posner 2011, p. 119-120; Camerer et al. 2003, p. 1240; Eidenmüller 2011, p. 10; Loewenstein 2000, p. 429). Even if the cooling-off period does not prevent consumers from concluding a transaction under an influence of fleeting emotions, it makes this decision reversible. Therefore, it should protect consumers from feeling regret about concluding the transaction and possibly encourage them to conclude more distance selling contracts in the future (Rekaiti and van den Bergh 2000, pp. 375-376). 
The additional advantage of introducing a mandatory cooling-off period in distance selling contracts could be that traders would lose the incentive to play on consumers’ emotions prior to and during the purchase (Camerer et al. 2003, p. 1240). Contrary to some of the opinions expressed in the academic literature (Eidenmüller 2011, p. 10, 18; Loos 2007, p. 10; Loos 2009, p. 247), consumers could easily be motivated by their emotions to conclude also distance selling contracts (Ariely and Simonson 2003, p. 116; Ding et al. 2005, p. 352; Verhagen and van Doelen 2009, p. 22). For example, the online stores’ setup could entice consumers to impulsive purchases (Verhagen and van Doelen 2009, p. 22).​[16]​ It is unlikely that the induced emotion, e.g., excitement, would hold for up to seven or fourteen days after the purchase and prevent a consumer from returning the goods. In that respect, the right of withdrawal could have a positive influence on consumers’ willingness to conclude distance selling contracts.
2.3.	 Correcting Information Bias 
Prior consumer behaviour research indicated that consumers tend to underestimate the transaction’s risk because of their optimism (Hillman and Rachlinski 2002, p. 483; Fischhoff et al. 1977, p. 561; Lichtenstein and Fischhoff 1977, pp. 159-183; Luth 2010, p. 50). While there is plenty of information to be gathered about the potential success of the transaction, many consumers could feel overwhelmed by the magnitude thereof (Luth 2010, p. 48; Twigg-Flesner and Schulze 2010, p. 130). They could prematurely stop gathering data about the transaction, due to an intuitive feeling that they have been sufficiently informed (Hansen 2005, p. 428; Hillman and Rachlinski 2002, p. 478-479; Rekaiti and van den Bergh 2000, p. 377). Ironically, consumers may refrain from gathering more information about the goods if they are afraid that too much information would impair their cognitive decision-making process (Bettman et al. 1998, pp. 187, 193, 199-200; Froomkin 2000, pp. 1501-1505; Hansen 2005, p. 425; Hillman and Rachlinski 2002, p. 479). Instead, they would focus on just one or two indicators of the goods’ quality (Bettman et al. 1998, p. 190; Hansen 2005, p. 420).​[17]​ The amount of information that consumers collect and process could depend on many factors, such as their cognitive abilities, involvement’s level, the transaction’s perceived risk and value, as well as consumers’ emotional approach to it (Hansen 2005, pp. 421, 425; Luth 2010, p. 48). In general, the amount of information consumers would collect and process is likely to be significantly lower than the trader’s information, which leads to information asymmetry between the parties (Twigg-Flesner and Schulze 2010, p. 145).​[18]​ Therefore, consumers might choose to conclude a contract that they would regret concluding had they further investigated transaction’s conditions. 
Above-described consumers’ information bias could justify the introduction of a mandatory right of withdrawal as a measure to protect irrational consumers from the effects of their less-fortunate choices. However, it could be questioned whether consumers would choose to have this protection over being able to pay less for their goods. The right of withdrawal could also discourage consumers from trying to find sufficient information about the goods they were purchasing, since it could correct any mistake in their preliminary evaluation after the fact (Eidenmüller 2011, p. 16). This could deepen the information asymmetry between the parties, since consumers might have no incentive to even try to estimate the goods’ value in advance. Of course, occasionally any consumer could benefit from the protection of the right of withdrawal, since often even if he did his best to properly estimate the goods’ value, he might have failed in this task. When the goods purchased are everyday goods of little value, a consumer’s mistake in the assessments thereof would not have drastic consequences to him (Eidenmüller 2011, p. 13). The right of withdrawal would be superfluous if through a learning process consumers started concluding only such distance selling transactions that they were happy with.​[19]​ However, it needs to be mentioned that every distance selling transaction is different and since behaviour is inconsistent over time it should not be easily assumed that consumers would not repeat their mistakes and learn to recognize the ‘good’ transactions from the ‘regrettable’ ones (Rekaiti and van den Bergh 2000, p. 377). Therefore, consumers could indeed be seen as benefiting from the mandatory right of withdrawal that protects them when they conclude a transaction they would later regret. 
2.4.	Trust and Confidence
The lack of any personal contact between consumers and traders in distance selling, may prevent consumers from correctly assessing the transaction’s reliability and from trusting in its success (Borges and Ilrenbusch 2007, p. 85).​[20]​ This lack of trust could prevent consumers from engaging in distance cross-border shopping (Harridge-March 2006, p. 746).​[21]​ Consumer psychology studies describe trust as a complex state, in which consumers have no certainty as to the other party’s motives and intentions, but where they have certain expectations as to them (Harridge-March 2006, p. 748). In general, trust is seen as not difficult to obtain, but it could also easily be lost (Hoffman et al. 1999, pp. 80-81). Trust in the virtual world, which is dominated by distance selling transactions, is given rather reluctantly, especially considering that for a completion of an online transaction consumers usually need to share their personal data (Harridge-March 2006, p. 749-750; Hoffman et al. 1999, pp. 80-81). Therefore, consumers often need to be specifically assured as to online transactions’ security, privacy and reliability (Harridge-March 2006, p. 750; Stanaland et al. 2011, p. 512). This could be achieved if online traders built their reputation and consumers spread the positive word-of-mouth about them, as well as if traders invested in privacy trustmarks (Harridge-March 2006, p. 748, 752; Stanaland et al. 2011, p. 512). Alternatively, consumers’ fears as to the reliability of distance selling transactions could be alleviated through the introduction of the right of withdrawal. This could, however, only be justified if consumers were indeed averse to concluding distance selling transactions and if the right of withdrawal’s existence increased consumers’ trust and confidence in such transactions’ success.
As far as the first issue is concerned, consumer psychology studies suggest that consumers are more likely to be savvy as to the goods they are being offered online rather than offline (Hillman and Rachlinski 2002, pp. 467, 478).​[22]​ It can be assumed that distance shopping gives consumers the comfort of concluding a transaction in a familiar environment (usually, at home), at any chosen by them time, which should also enable a careful consideration of the transaction’s value (Eidenmüller 2011, p. 10). Consumers may, for example, easily hop from one online shop to another to compare prices and other shopping conditions. They may also postpone making a transactional decision until they are certain of their wish to conclude a contract and minimise the potential post-decision regret (Hillman and Rachlinski 2002, p. 478). However, the question remains whether consumers would want to invest their time into such online comparative shopping. Studies show that online consumers are used to instant gratification and specifically use the internet as means to save their shopping time (Donthu and Garcia 1999, p. 56). Moreover, online transactions usually put consumers at more risks than offline transactions (Harridge-March 2006, p. 748). One reason for it could be the lack of consumers’ control over online transactions, another, a great level of anonymity that could be exploited by rogue traders. A similar assessment could be conducted with regards to distance selling contracts concluded offline. For example, telemarketers could call consumers at unexpected times, taking away their control as to when to conclude a contract. Additionally, also the telephone’s anonymity could facilitate a certain misuse of consumers’ data. 
Consequently, it seems that consumers’ lack of trust flowing from worries about distance selling traders’ and the transaction’s reliability may not be easy to placate. Moreover, consumers’ confidence could also suffer because they have no means to physically check the goods’ quality (Harridge-March 2006, p. 748; Stanaland et al. 2011, p. 512). One of the biggest risks for a consumer concluding a distance selling contract is to receive goods that deviate from what he has expected to receive or having nothing delivered (Harridge-March 2006, p. 754). The right of withdrawal could diminish this risk, though if the payment was already made by the consumer it would not be likely that the money would be returned by any rogue traders.
Whether the fact that consumers are given the mandatory right of withdrawal increases their confidence is debatable. Unfortunately, it is hard to measure this effect of the right of withdrawal and to provide any hard data to support this assessment (Eidenmüller 2011, p. 6). Additionally, it needs to be specified that it is not really ‘trust’ that consumers feel with respect to the distance selling contract’s success and reliability, if they experience this emotion only when they are given a way out of this transaction. If the risk is taken away, then there is no uncertainty left that needs to be overcome by trust. Regardless this debacle, empirical proof is needed to support the European institutions’ claim that the mandatory right of withdrawal could increase the consumers’ confidence and encourage them to conclude more distance selling contracts.
3.	Potential Unwanted Effects of the Mandatory Right of Withdrawal
The previous chapter showed that the mandatory right of withdrawal in distance selling was introduced to protect European consumers when they concluded a transaction too hasty, without sufficient information, due to wrong motivations, etc. If the assumption that consumers who conclude distance selling contracts often end up regretting it were correct, then we should see a huge amount of such contracts being cancelled upon the introduction of the right of withdrawal. Studies show that the number of European consumers exercising their right of withdrawal increased in the past years and ca. 15-20 per cent of distance selling transactions are being cancelled (European Commission September 2006, p. 36; European Commission October 2008, p. 59). This amount may seem high at first, but it is mostly the same consumers who use their right of withdrawal with regards to various goods they purchase.​[23]​ The low number of consumers using their right of withdrawal could be due to traders providing consumers with mostly high quality goods, upon realizing that consumers were able to terminate any transaction after receiving unsatisfactory goods. However, it is also possible that the right of withdrawal instead of motivating traders to improve their services’ quality simply malfunctions. This would be the case if consumers who have received unsatisfactory goods would not use their right of withdrawal. This chapter examines various phenomena identified in consumer psychology studies that, if at work, could prevent consumers either from exercising their right of withdrawal or from benefiting from it. The following paragraphs show, therefore, a potential negative effect that the introduction of the mandatory right of withdrawal may have on consumers.
3.1.	Aversion to Loss
Many behavioural studies examined consumers inability to properly predict costs and benefits of choices they have made (Baron and Ritov 1994, p. 479; Camerer et al. 2003, p. 1218; Choi et al. 2003, p. 184; Kahneman et al. 1991, pp. 194, 199; Schwartz 2004, p. 70; Schweitzer 1994, p.458; Thaler 1980, pp. 42-43). This tendency to miscalculation could confirm the general belief surrounding conclusion of distance selling contracts that consumers might not be able to correctly estimate the goods’ value. In consumer psychology this inclination is often attributed to consumers’ loss aversion, that is consumers placing a greater negative value on losses they have experienced than a positive value on equivalent benefits they have gained (Baron and Ritov 1994, p. 479; Camerer et al. 2003, p. 1218; Choi et al. 2003, p. 184; Kahneman et al. 1991, pp. 194, 199; Schwartz 2004, p. 70; Schweitzer 1994, p.458; Thaler 1980, pp. 42-43). The phenomenon of loss aversion might prevent consumers from taking any actions, which could generate a risk of even small losses, despite these actions being likely to result in greater gains.
Therefore, if the right of withdrawal is associated by consumers with loss, they may be less likely to use this legal instrument, which could explain the mediocre number of consumers using this right (European Commission September 2006, p. 36; European Commission October 2008, p. 59). The European legislator tries to prevent such an association by granting consumers the right of withdrawal’s use free of charge (Loos 2007, p. 19; Twigg-Flesner and Schulze 2010, p. 155). However, despite this assurance, there are at least some costs that consumers need to pay when they use this right, such as costs of returning the goods to traders, and possibly also costs for the goods’ depreciation or use. Furthermore, if a service that was purchased by a consumer has already partially been performed before the consumer used his right of withdrawal that could also raise the withdrawal costs since the consumer would need to reimburse a trader for already performed services (Rott and Terryn 2010, p. 263). Even the sole fact that the goods need to be returned may be perceived as loss by consumers.​[24]​ If all these costs loom larger for consumers than costs of keeping the goods, they would not be likely to choose to return the goods to traders. 
From this perspective, the consumer protection level set by the mandatory right of withdrawal depends solely on consumers’ evaluation which decision would result in more costs: when a consumer keeps the goods or when he returns them. With this in mind, it needs to be noted that the European legislator decided to obligate consumers to pay for the depreciation of the goods’ value during the cooling-off period in the new Consumer Rights Directive.​[25]​ This new provision is likely to increase consumers’ perception of loss associated with exercising the right of withdrawal. Consequently, it could diminish this right’s value as a consumer protection measure (Twigg-Flesner and Schulze 2010, p. 156).
3.2.	Endowment Effect
Consumer behaviouralists estimate that consumers are more likely to attach a high value to the goods that have been in their possession than those that are not part of their ‘endowment’ and that attachment just increases with time (Kahneman et al. 1991, p. 194; Luth 2010, p. 52; Schwartz 2004, p. 71; Strahilevitz and Loewenstein 1998, p. 276; Sunstein and Thaler 2003, pp. 22-23; Thaler 1980, p. 44). The endowment effect capitalizes on the consumers’ aversion to loss, since it is not the goods’ attractiveness and the pleasures of owning them that increases with time, but rather the negative emotions associated with losing these goods. (Kahneman et al. 1991, p. 197; Tversky and Kahneman 1991, p. 1041). 
The mandatory right of withdrawal in distance selling contracts enables consumers to have the goods in their possession during the cooling-off period in order to properly assess their value. Unfortunately, due to the endowment effect, consumers may overestimate the goods’ value, once they have received them. As some researchers put it, the goods’ allocation affects consumers’ valuation (Thaler 1980, p. 46; Strahilevitz and Loewenstein 1998, p. 276). When a consumer purchases the goods he may think that in the worst case scenario he would return them within the cooling-off period bearing obligatory postage costs. However, when the goods are in his possession and he starts thinking of them as ‘his’, he may perceive the cost of keeping them as an opportunity cost which is associated more with gains than losses (Thaler 1980, p. 44). That does not necessarily mean that the consumer started valuing the goods more, since if the goods would be stolen and he would be reimbursed for their value, he would not necessarily buy the same goods for the same price again (Thaler 1980, p. 46). The endowment effect may, therefore, disguise the goods’ actual value and could prevent consumers from exercising their right of withdrawal. 
Additionally, the longer the cooling-off period lasts and the more a consumer waits until its end to decide whether to keep the goods, the less likely it is that he would return the goods (Tversky and Shafir 1992, p. 358). After all, his attachment to the goods is presumed to increase with every day the goods are in his possession (Strahilevitz and Loewenstein 1998, p. 286). In this regard, cooling-off period’s prolongation in the recent Consumer Rights Directive may not be seen as a positive development from the point of view of consumers’ interests, since it could contribute to further inefficient decision-making.
3.3.	Omission, Commission and Status Quo Bias
While consumers have a generic aversion to loss, it seems that this aversion’s scale could depend on what type of consumer behaviour caused the loss. In general, consumers tend to be more concerned about the negative results of their actions (commission) rather than their inactions (omission) (Baron and Ritov 1994, p. 475; Camerer et al. 2003, p. 1224-1225; Gilovich et al. 1995, p. 182; Harridge-March 2006, p. 747; Savitsky et al. 1997, p. 248; Schwartz 2004, p. 149). This may be attributed to the consumer’s perception of actions as more ‘abnormal’ than inactions (Gilovich et al 1995, p. 182; Gilovich and Medvec 1995, p. 386; Savitsky et al 1997, pp. 248-249). This is manifested by consumers generally being able to easier imagine themselves as not performing a certain action (and the consequences thereof), than imagining carrying out actions they have not performed. This tendency allows consumers to conceive with greater ease alternatives to the behaviour they have already conducted and, therefore, to regret such a behaviour, if the other, imagined alternatives are more attractive (Gilovich et al 1995, p. 182; Gilovich and Medvec 1995, p. 381; Savitsky et al 1997, p. 249). This effect tends to be more visible in short-term decision making, which is especially relevant to this research due to the time limits placed on the cooling-off period (Savitsky et al 1997, p. 249). In the consumer psychology studies on this phenomenon it has also been argued that consumers would feel more personally responsible for their actions rather than inactions. It would be the actions that would be perceived as a deviation from the ‘status quo’, which could lead to consumers developing an ‘omission bias’ and being unwilling to undertake certain actions in anticipation of regret (Baron and Ritov 1994, pp. 478-479; Gilovich et al 1995, p. 189; Gilovich and Medvec 1995, p. 393; Luth 2010, p. 52; Schwartz 2004, p. 159; Schweitzer 1994, p.459; Thaler 1980, pp. 52-53). 
A consumer who concluded a distance selling contract with an option to exercise the right of withdrawal could, therefore, be discouraged from using this right, since taking such an action could lead to negative consequences for him. Studies on a common consumers’ dilemma of whether to keep the goods one has or whether to exchange them for something else, potentially better, showed that consumers were more likely to be worried that they would regret returning the goods rather than keeping them, since they already had them in their keep (Gilovich et al 1995, p. 183).​[26]​ Consumers seem to not be likely to relinquish goods for the same price they have received them (Baron and Ritov 1994, p. 477). The resulting inertia (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, pp. 22) of consumers could prevent them from effectively using their right of withdrawal, reducing its value for consumer protection. 
This behavioural phenomenon may, however, also prevent consumers from opting in the right of withdrawal if it ever stops being a mandatory European measure. If the status quo of a transaction is that consumers purchase distance selling goods without the right of withdrawal (but, e.g., at a lower price), they may abstain from choosing to enrich their contracts by opting into this right at a price increase. The omission bias is likely to convince consumers that they may regret more their action to pay for a possibility to use the right of withdrawal rather than an inaction of not obtaining this optional right and just proceeding with their default rights.
In general, these biases show that consumers are more likely to stay inactive than to undertake an action. The mandatory right of withdrawal requires an action from consumers, which could again explain the relatively low number of consumers using this right. This state of affairs could be changed, by the European legislator obligating consumers to return the goods after the end of the cooling-off period unless they had decided to stay bound by the transaction. This solution could be seen as a more effective consumer protection measure from the perspective of avoiding the above-described biases since consumers would not be bound by a distance selling transaction even in case of their inactivity.​[27]​ An action would be required of consumers in either case: to return the goods at the end of the cooling-off period or to confirm the transaction. That solution could eliminate the consumers’ omission bias.​[28]​
3.4.	Cognitive Dissonances
While the endowment effect may cause consumers to overvalue the goods that are already in their possession, cognitive dissonances act similarly with regards to consumers’ beliefs and opinions. Namely, consumers tend to favour beliefs which are consistent with their previously expressed, preferred option (Hansen 2005, p. 432; Jain and Maheswaran 2000, p. 368; Kunda 1990, p. 493; Luth 2010, p. 51).​[29]​ When a consumer decides to purchase goods, he has some positive expectations as to them and their value. If upon the goods’ delivery the consumer then encounters facts that contradict his previous beliefs he could diminish their importance or even disregard them in favour of findings that would confirm his original assessment of the goods (Akerlof 1991, p. 7; Jain and Maheswaran 2000, p. 367). As a result, the goods’ evaluation during the cooling-off period may be distorted, similarly to the endowment effect’s influence, which could prevent European consumers from using their right of withdrawal.
Cognitive dissonances may also discourage consumers from using their right of withdrawal if they occur in combination with the omission/ commission biases. If consumers feel more regret from their actions than their inactions in a short term, they may start mentally compensating for this feeling of regret. Due to the dissonance’s reduction, they could start valuing more the goods they have obtained due to an action they initially regretted rather than goods they have due to their inaction (Gilovich et al 1995, p. 186; Gilovich and Medvec 1995, p. 385; Savitsky et al 1997, p. 249). This could lead European consumers who were initially unhappy with their distance selling transaction to value the goods they had purchased above their actual price or quality and discourage them from using the right of withdrawal. Consequently, consumers could deceive themselves into judging a transaction as successful and entering into more of such transactions, contributing to further market’s inefficiency.​[30]​
3.5.	Procrastination
Procrastination leads to a consumers’ belief that they do not need to take a specific action at a given moment, since they will still have time for it in the future, while in reality they will delay in the future, as well (Akerlof 1991, p. 1; Camerer et al. 2003, p. 1225; Luth 2010, p. 52). As a result of procrastination, consumers continue waiting and being inactive instead of acting (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999, p. 104). This effect is especially visible when a task a consumer needs to perform is tedious and costs him time, money or effort, since consumers who postpone taking a decision often struggle with self-control problems due to a preference for immediate gratification (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999, p. 103; O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001, p. 121; Thaler 1980, pp. 56-57). If consumers want to perform only pleasurable and beneficial tasks, it could be assumed that they would choose to engage in an enjoyable activity at any given moment, therefore, always choosing to delay the performance of the original, tedious task (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999, p. 103). Unfortunately, introducing deadlines in order to motivate consumers to take a decision may backfire, since consumers are likely then to delay their action until the deadline is looming ahead and they could even miss the deadline (Akerlof 1991, p. 4; Camerer et al. 2003, p. 1247; Choi et al. 2003, p. 180; Luth 2010, p. 53). Furthermore, informing consumers on their tendency to procrastinate may not be effective either, since even if consumers are (made) aware of their problems with self-control, they still may underestimate this phenomenon’s scale (O’Donoghue & Rabin 1999, p. 111, 119; O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001, pp. 122-123). Increasing the perception of the task’s importance, in order to motivate consumers to act is likely to fail, as well (O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001, p. 125).​[31]​
Procrastination could discourage consumers from using their right of withdrawal immediately upon discovering that the delivered goods were unsatisfactory. Even consumers who realize that they are delaying with sending the goods back could be optimistic and believe that they would find time to withdraw from a contract in the remaining cooling-off period (O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001, p. 123). It would be interesting to see empirical research conducted on this subject, assessing how many consumers wanted to use their right but did not manage to exercise it within the cooling-off period.
The European legislator seems to already be considering the procrastination’s effects on consumers at least as far as the right of withdrawal’s performance and its consequences are concerned. European consumers are allowed to withdraw from a distance selling contract by just notifying a trader of their decision within the cooling-off period (Rott and Terryn 2010, p. 265). Since studies estimate that it may be unrealistic to expect consumers to accomplish a task all at once, it may be beneficial that consumers do not have to return the goods simultaneously with sending the withdrawal notification (O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001, p. 149). Considering consumers’ tendency to procrastinate with the task’s completion, the trader’s right to withhold consumer’s money until he receives the goods back seems justified, as well (O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001, p. 150). This could encourage consumers to finalize the withdrawal by promptly returning the goods. 
Contrarily, the cooling-off period’s prolongation in the Consumer Rights Directive could be questioned from the point of view of consumers’ interests. While generally a long cooling-off period is perceived as benefiting consumers and harming traders, the opposite could be true due to procrastination’s effects (Loos 2009, p. 244). The more time consumers have to delay their action, the more likely they are to postpone the right of withdrawal’s performance. It is likely that more distractions would hinder consumers’ withdrawal from a contract in fourteen rather than seven days. Some researchers suggested that in order to counteract procrastination the default option offered to consumers should be the worst possible, since that could motivate them to an immediate action (Akerlof 1991, p. 2; Choi et al. 2003, p. 185).​[32]​ In this regard, even seven working days of a cooling-off period may be perceived as an overly long period (Loos 2009, p. 243).​[33]​
3.6.	Choice Paradox
The mandatory right of withdrawal in distance selling contracts grants European consumers a choice to either retain the goods and the contract or to return the goods, withdraw from a contract and possibly look for other goods or a new transaction. When consumers have to make a choice, they need to consider which of the available options they prefer. This decision-making may depend on many factors, such as, e.g., the options’ context and framing, the tasks’ complexity, the consumer’s goals (Bettman et al. 1998, p. 188). To take a rational, cost-effective decision that he would not regret, a consumer must gather sufficient information on all available options, the value of either staying in the transaction or withdrawing from it (Bettman et al. 1998, p. 189; Tversky and Shafir 1992, p. 358). Consumer psychology studies conclude that if consumers are constantly facing more choice, they are likely not to be satisfied with the choice they have already made and to constantly feel compelled to continue looking for better options (Schwartz 2004, p. 36). 
The right of withdrawal gives consumers time to reconsider their decision to conclude a distance selling contract. Allowing for this ‘choice’, consumers may feel the need to prevail in investing their time and effort to further search for a better deal during the cooling-off period. This so-called ‘opportunistic’ behaviour of consumers is what many traders fear the introduction of the mandatory right of withdrawal would lead to. What is rarely mentioned, however, is that this measure could also be detrimental to consumers, since the option to choose more and better could have turned them into maximizers – people who seek and accept only the best (Schwartz 2004, pp. 78, 96). Maximizers usually end up struggling for happiness and devoting time they could have spent on being with family, working etc., to choosing more and better (Schwartz 2004, pp. 111).
The right of withdrawal’s aim in distance selling transactions was to protect consumers by giving them an additional opportunity to reconsider the contract. However, that increase in choice could as well lead to consumers’ confusion, indecisiveness and increase of the decision-making costs by magnifying the amount of time and effort consumers would spend on deciding. To answer a query whether the choice paradox indeed has a negative effect on consumers’ experience of the right of withdrawal requires more empirical research.
3.7.	Cost Inefficiency 
If a consumer uses the goods during the cooling-off period, it may lead to the depreciation of the goods’ value. This is often perceived as the main reason why traders would not be willing to grant the right of withdrawal to consumers if it were not a mandatory instrument in European consumer law. Unfortunately, if traders are forced to provide consumers with the right of withdrawal, they are likely to compensate their losses by raising the goods’ prices in expectation of consumers exercising their right. However, current European data suggest that not many consumers are using this right.​[34]​ This could result in contracts being less efficient, if the goods’ prices reflect the traders’ expectation that the right of withdrawal may be used, and consumers do not act thereupon. Therefore, consumers’ attitude to the mandatory right of withdrawal may be negative if it unnecessarily leads to the increase of consumer goods’ prices.​[35]​
Additional cost inefficiency that the right of withdrawal’s use might reveal is the discouragement it gives to a consumer to contemplate his purchases and to gather information about the goods before he concludes the transaction. If a consumer knows that he may examine the goods after the purchase and that the costs of returning the goods during the cooling-off period are low, he has no incentive to properly examine the goods in advance (Scott and Triantis 2004, p. 1474). When a trader calculates these uninformed consumers in his business costs, he has to consider that such consumers are likely to increase the amount of returned goods among the sold goods. This could result in the increase of the goods’ prices for all consumers. Then the more attentive and better informed consumers could be discouraged from concluding a transaction with such a trader, since they would consider the goods’ price too high (Scott and Triantis 2004, p. 1474). Consequently, the amount of the cancelled distance selling contracts could increase even more.
One of the potential solutions that could be offered to solve this dilemma would be to enable traders to offer their goods at different prices with various options of the right of withdrawal (Scott and Triantis 2004, p. 1460-1461).​[36]​ A consumer who would invest in gathering information about the goods and their value would either opt out of the right of withdrawal or would choose a short-time right of withdrawal. Alternatively, for consumers who would not invest in gathering information there could be an option to pay a higher price and to have a longer cooling-off period available.​[37]​ 
4.	Non-Mandatory Right of Withdrawal
There could be many reasons for which European consumers would not have a preference for the mandatory right of withdrawal in distance selling contracts. Some consumers, who behave rationally while deciding whether to conclude contract, would not need this right’s existence, since they are capable of analysing contractual costs and benefits and would not easily fall prey to the above-described behavioural biases. Other consumers would prefer to pay less for the goods rather than to be granted the right of withdrawal, even if they were not capable of properly estimating the contract’s value (Hansen 2005, p. 424). Still other consumers would not care about this right, since they would not be likely to enforce any of their rights (Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar 2012, pp. 8-12, 20). Finally, less rational consumers who could use the right of withdrawal’s protection the most are also the most likely to succumb to one of the above-described behavioural traps and not benefit from the right’s existence. All of these consumers may perceive the paternalistic decision to introduce the mandatory right of withdrawal in distance selling transactions as burdensome and unnecessary (Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar 2012, pp. 8-12; Camerer et al. 2003, p. 1214). The question is whether any other regulatory option could fulfil the same aims and possibly reduce the mentioned disadvantages.
4.1.	Leaving It To the Market
The opposite solution to the introduction of the mandatory right of withdrawal would be to leave it to the market to introduce this legal instrument where it is needed (Eidenmüller 2011, p. 10). However, while that solution would be welcomed by fully rational consumers, it would completely devoid the less rational group of consumers of protection. Consequently, many consumers may end up regretting transactions they have concluded and withhold from further participation in distance selling. Alternatively, with the lapse of time consumers may convince themselves that they are happy with the originally unfortunate transaction, e.g., due to the cognitive dissonances’ effect. This could contribute to misleading positive word-of-mouth reviews that could entice more consumers to fall into the same market trap. It is uncertain whether such an effect could contribute to the desired integration of the internal market. A compromise between these two extreme solutions should be contemplated.
4.2.	Statutory Right of Withdrawal – Consumer’s Choice
Such a compromise solution could be to yield the institution of the mandatory right of withdrawal and instead to urge consumers to make their choices explicit (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, pp. 35). For example, the European legislator could require any distance selling transaction to be offered with and without the right of withdrawal. This optional right of withdrawal would be a consumer’s statutory right in distance selling contracts (Eidenmüller 2011, p. 11). Traders would not be given a possibility to choose a default option for consumers. Instead, the choice whether to opt into a transaction with or without this right would be left entirely to consumers (Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar 2012, pp. 19-20). With this solution, consumers who require more protection and who are uncertain whether they have correctly calculated the goods’ value could add a stipulation on the right of withdrawal to their contract. It would be as if they took a certain ‘insurance’ of goods’ high quality, by paying an extra cost for the right of withdrawal that would be attached to their contract (Eidenmüller 2011, p. 11). This could entice consumers to conclude distance selling contracts at a similar rate as the mandatory right of withdrawal does, since traders would not be able to block the right of withdrawal’s application upon consumers’ choice. However, this solution ignores the issue of such consumers who are not going to add this right to their contract due to the above-described consumer psychology phenomena. This could remove the protection from those who need it the most – consumers who are less informed, with bounded rationality, prone to inactivity and procrastination while deciding. Such consumers are only then sufficiently protected by European consumer law when they are given the right of withdrawal’s protection regardless of their inactivity in acquiring such a right themselves (Camerer et al. 2003, p. 1225). 
4.3.	Opt-out or Opt-in
Alternatively, the European legislator could offer consumers a choice of concluding a transaction with or without a right of withdrawal with the box grating consumers this right already pre-marked (Dreier 2010, p. 145; Eidenmüller 2011, p. 12). The default would then make the right of withdrawal a standard term in consumer distance selling contracts, unless a consumer expressly relinquished this right by ‘unchecking’ the box. In this opt-out system inactive consumers would be automatically protected by the addition of this right to their contract (Dreier 2010, p. 144). Since fully rational consumers are able to properly estimate transaction’s costs and benefits and would know when to opt-out, this opt-out system seems quite beneficial to European consumers. Unless, upon more research into the above-presented consumer psychology findings, it would be determined that the existence of any right of withdrawal in distance selling transactions could only exceptionally be beneficial to consumers. In that case, a possibility to opt-in into this right could be a preferred solution. Either alternative has to be carefully considered by the European legislator since consumer psychology studies show that defaults are often perceived by consumers as recommendations of a specific course of action and increase their laziness in the decision-making process (Choi et al. 2003, p. 184; Johnson et al. 2002, p. 7). Moreover, a pre-ticked box could be perceived as a reference point of what consumers have the right to, which would set the loss aversion into play when the switch is considered (Choi et al. 2003, p. 184). Studies suggest that whatever box about the right of withdrawal would be ‘checked’, it would most likely stay ‘checked’. 
4.4.	Right To Uphold the Contract
Finally, in order to counteract the consumers’ procrastination, as well as the effects of other behavioural phenomena that could prevent consumers from exercising their right of withdrawal, such as, e.g., the endowment effect and the omission bias, the mandatory right of withdrawal could be replaced by the right to uphold the contract (Eidenmüller 2011, p. 20). In this scenario, every distance selling contract would be concluded only for seven or fourteen days (cooling-off period). After the cooling-off period, the contract would be automatically terminated with the obligation for both parties to return what they have received during its duration. The termination would take place, unless consumers would notify traders and confirm that they wanted to stay bound by the contract. On the one hand, this method could protect consumers from their own inactiveness as well as various irrationalities that are engrained in their nature. On the other hand, this solution places a lot of costs on traders, since they would bear the responsibility of drawing consumers’ attention to the cooling-off period’s lapse and to the need for the contract’s confirmation. Therefore, traders would need to prevail over some of the above-mentioned behavioural biases that would urge consumers to go with the default option – in this case, automatic termination of the contract. However, other behavioural phenomena, like the endowment effect, could help convince consumers to confirm the transaction.
5.	To Withdraw or Not To Withdraw?
The Consumer Rights Directive once more granted European consumers the mandatory right of withdrawal’s protection in distance selling transactions. Chapter two of this article showed that many of the behavioural assumptions underlying the introduction of this right could be valid, justifying such a legislative move. However, chapter three of this article exposed certain behavioural phenomena that could negatively influence the mandatory right of withdrawal’s perception and its use. Ultimately, this could increase consumers’ unhappiness with concluded contracts and make them regret their participation in distance selling transactions. This would be detrimental to the internal market’s further development.
The right of withdrawal may not be used even if consumers were originally dissatisfied with the received goods, due to consumers’ loss aversion, if they think that the withdrawal from a contract would be costly. In this respect, the new Consumer Rights Directive’s provision on compensation for goods’ depreciation in value may increase the perception of withdrawal’s costs by consumers. The endowment effect and cognitive dissonances may leave consumers believing in a self-inflated goods’ value, which would weigh against making use of the right of withdrawal, as well. Additionally, consumers may simply miss the cooling-off period’s deadline due to their own procrastination or fear of undertaking an action. The mandatory right of withdrawal’s introduction may also be seen as increasing consumers’ contractual choices. However, such a choices’ increase could harm consumers by causing more confusion, indecisiveness and extrapolated decision-making costs. Again, the new provisions on the right of withdrawal may be detrimental to consumers since they prolong the cooling-off period, giving consumers more time to fall into behavioural traps. When all these behavioural biases and phenomena wear off, consumers could remain with purchased, unsatisfactory goods, with no possibility any longer to withdraw from a contract. 
The academic literature on asymmetric (Camerer et al. 2003, p. 1212) or libertarian (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, p. 4) or soft (Luth 2010, pp. 72-73) paternalism suggests that a regulator should look for solutions that would support and protect the weaker, less rational parties, while at the same time these solutions should not harm fully rational consumers. This article cannot be conclusive in its policy recommendations due to the lack of sufficient empirical research allowing to predict the real-life effects of the regulatory rules on the right of withdrawal. More empirical research is needed to estimate whether the right of withdrawal’s negative effects outweigh its benefits in contractual decision-making for irrational and rational consumers. Conducting such an empirical research would be costly and complicated, especially if a field experiment would be chosen over a lab experiment, which could provide more accurate results as to consumers’ attitudes to the right of withdrawal and as to their use thereof. Since a European field experiment in this case is impossible, due to the mandatory nature of the withdrawal right in Europe, one solution would be to examine how under different options to withdraw from a contract, for example with shorter or longer cooling-off period, consumers elsewhere are influenced. However, the researchers would need to discount for any differences in the behaviour of European consumers against examined consumers. Any conducted empirical research, whether it were lab or field experiments, would need to take into account all of the above-mentioned behavioural phenomena in order to have a true value to the European legislator. 
On the basis of the currently available data presented in this article it can be questioned whether the introduction of the mandatory right of withdrawal in distance selling contracts contributed to the well-being of consumers, as it was supposed to do. Therefore, it may be worthwhile for the European institutions to reanalyse consumer protection in distance selling transactions and to consider promoting consumer psychology studies in order to benefit from them in the policy-making process. Depending on the results of further empirical research, the European regulator may need to reconsider the institution of the mandatory right of withdrawal in distance selling transactions in order to reconcile the interests of irrational and rational consumers. Other measures, from among the ones mentioned in chapter four, could be contemplated in order to diminish the mandatory right of withdrawal’s negative effect. Regardless of the specifics of how to provide the right of withdrawal to consumers, it is clear that the European institutions should reconsider the right of withdrawal’s influence on consumers’ wellbeing. 

Reference list:
Akerlof, G. (1970). The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. Quarterly Journal for Economics, 84, 488.
Akerlof, G. (1991). Procrastination and Obedience. The American Economic Review, 81 (2), 1-19.
Ariely, D., & Simonson, I. (2003). Buying, Bidding, Playing, or Competing? Value Assessment and Decision Dynamics in Online Auctions. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 13, 113-123.
Bar-Gill, O., & Ben-Shahar, O. (2012). Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection: A Critique of the Common European Sales Law. NYU Law & Economics Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-12, 1-33.
Baron, J., & Ritov, I. (1994). Reference Points and Omission Bias. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 59, 475-498.
Ben-Shahar, O., & Posner, E.A. (2011). The right to withdraw in contract law. The Journal of Legal Studies, 40, 115-148.
Bettman, J.R., Luce, M.F., & Payne, J.W. (1998). Constructive Consumer Choice Processes. Journal of Consumer Research, 25, 187-217.
Borges, G., & Ilrenbusch, B. (2007). Fairness Crowded Out by Law: An Experimental Study on Withdrawal Rights. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 163, 84-101.
Camerer, C., Issacharoff, S., Loewenstein, G., O’Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (2003). Regulation for conservatives: behavioral economics and the case for “assymetric paternalism”. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 151, 1211-1254.
Choi, J.J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B.C., & Metrick, A. (2003). Optimal Defaults. The American Economic Review, 93, 180-185.
Ding, M., Eliashberg, J., Huber, J., & Saini, R. (2005). Emotional Bidders – An Analytical and Experimental Examination of Consumers’ Behavior in a Priceline-Like Reverse Auction. Management Science, 51, 352-364.
Donthu, N., & Garcia, A. (1999). The Internet Shopper. Journal of Advertising Research¸ 39/3, 52-58.
Dreier, T. (2010). ”Opt in” and “opt out” mechanisms in the internet era – towards a common theory. Computer Law and Security Report, 26, 144-150.
Eidenmüller, H. (2011). Why Withdrawal Rights? European Review of Contract Law, 1, 1-24.
European Commission. (September 2006). Consumer protection in the internal market. Special Eurobarometer 252. 
European Commission. (October 2008). Consumer protection in the internal market. Special Eurobarometer 298.
European Commission. (March 2011). Consumer attitudes towards cross-border trade and consumer protection. Analytical report. Flash Eurobarometer 299.
European Commission. (22 July 2013). The Consumer Conditions Scoreboard. Consumers at home in the single market. Commission Staff Working Document. Ninth Edition. SWD(2013) 291 final.
Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1977). Knowing with Certainty: The Appropriateness of Extreme Confidence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 3 (4), 552-564.
Froomkin, A.M. (2000). The Death of Privacy?: A New Legal Paradigm?. Stanford Law Review, 52, 1461-1543.
Gilovich, T., & Husted Medvec, V. (1995). The Experience of Regret: What, When, and Why. Psychological Review, 102 (2), 379-395.
Gilovich, T., Husted Medvec, V., & Chen, S. (1995). Commission, Omission and Dissonance Reduction: Coping with Regret in the “Monty Hall” Problem. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 182-190.
Hansen, T. (2005). Perspectives on consumer decision making: An integrated approach. Journal of Consumer Behaviour, 4, 420-437.
Harridge-March, S. (2006). Can the building of trust overcome consumer perceived risk online? Marketing Intelligence & Planning, 24 (7), 746-761.
Hillman, R.A., & Rachlinski, J.J. (2002). Standard-form contracting in the electronic age. New York University Law Review, 77, 429-495.
Hoffman, D.L., Novak, T.P., & Peralta, M. (1999). Building Consumer Trust Online, Communications of the ACM, 42 (4), 80-85.
Jain, S.P., & Maheswaran, D. (2000). Motivated reasoning: A depth-of-processing perspective. Journal of Consumer Research, 26 (4), 358-371.
Johnson, E.J., Bellman, S., Lohse, G.L. (2002). Defaults, Framing and Privacy: Why Opting In-Opting Out. Marketing Letters, 13, 5-15.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J.L., & Thaler, R.H. (1991) Anomalies: The Endownment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5 (1), 193-206.
Kunda, Z. (1990) The case for motivated reasoning, Psychological Bulletin, 108 (3), 480-498.
Lichtenstein, S., & Fischhoff, B. (1977). Do those who know more also know more about how much they know? Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 20, 159-183.
Loewenstein, G. (2000). Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior. The American Economic Review, 90 (2), 426-432.
Loos, M. (2007). The case for a uniform and efficient right of withdrawal from consumer contracts. Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht, 15 (1), 5-36.
Loos, M. (2009). Rights of Withdrawal. In G. Howells & R. Schulze (Eds.), Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law (pp. 237-277). Munich: Sellier. European Law Publishers.
Luth, H. (2010). Behavioural Economics in Consumer Policy. Antwerp: Intersentia.
O’Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (1999). Doing It Now or Later. The American Economic Review, 89 (1), 103-124.
O’Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (2001). Choice and Procrastination. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116 (1), 121-160.
Rekaiti, P., & van den Bergh, R. (2000). Cooling-Off Periods in the Consumer Laws of the EC Member States. A Comparative Law and Economics Approach. Journal of Consumer Policy, 23, 371-407.
Rott, P., & Terryn, E. (2010). The Right of Withdrawal and standard terms. In H.W. Micklitz, J. Stuyck & E. Terryn (Eds.), Consumer Law (pp. 239-279). Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing.
Savitsky, K., Husted Medvec, V., & Gilovich, T. (1997). Remembering and Regretting: The Zeigarnik Effect and the Cognitive Availability of Regrettable Actions and Inactions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 248-257.
Schwartz, B. (2004). The Paradox of Choice. New York: Harper Perennial.
Schweitzer, M. (1994). Disentangling Status Quo and Omission Effects: An Experimental Analysis, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 58, 457-476.
Scott, R.E., & Triantis, G.G. (2004). Embedded Options and the Case against Compensation in Contract Law. Columbia Law Review, 104, 1428-1491.
Stanaland, A.J.S., Lwin, M.O., & Miyazaki, A.D. (2011). Online Privacy Trustmarks. Enhancing the Perceived Ethics of Digital Advertising. Journal of Advertising Research, September, 511-523.
Steenkamp, J.B.E.M. (1989). Product Quality: An investigation into the concept and how it is perceived by consumers. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Strahilevitz, M.A., & Loewenstein, G. (1998). The Effect of Ownership History on the Valuation of Objects. Journal of Consumer Research, 25, 276-289.
Sunstein, C.R., & Thaler, R.H. Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron. John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 185, <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html>>.
Thaler, R.H. (1980). Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1, 39-60 .
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991). Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (4), 1039-1061.
Tversky, A., & Shafir, E. (1992). Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamics of Deferred Decision. Psychological Science, 3 (6), 358-361.
Twigg-Flesner, Ch., & Schulze, R. (2010). Protecting rational choice: information and the right of withdrawal. In G. Howells, I. Ramsay, T. Wilhelmsson & D. Kraft (Eds.), Handbook of Research on International Consumer Law (pp.130-157). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Verhagen, T., & van Doelen, W. (2009). The influence of online store characteristics on consumer impulsive decision-making: a model and empirical application, Serie Research Memoranda VU, 46, 1-33, << http://dare.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/handle/1871/15294/20090046.pdf;jsessionid=637B1B89F909288941DC3462DA2BECCB?sequence=2 >> 








^1	  Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts, OJ L 144, 04/06/1997, p. 0019-0027.
^2	  Directive 2011/82/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p. 0064-0088. The Consumer Rights Directive aims at harmonising the right of withdrawal for two types of consumer contracts: distance and doorstep selling and needs to be implemented by Member States by the end of 2013.
^3	  Surveys show that not many European consumers use their right of withdrawal (14% - in: European Commission September 2006, p. 36; 19% - in: European Commission October 2008, p. 59). Though some researchers report that the number of cancelled distance selling contracts continues to increase, reaching an alarming ratio of 35% in Germany, these studies also suggest that most returns are conducted by the same, small number of consumers (Borges and Irlenbusch 2007, p. 87). Since the report in 2008, the newer reports mention the consumers’ level of knowledge about the right of withdrawal and not whether they actually use it – currently 69% of European consumers are aware of their right (European Commission 22.07.2013, p. 57).
^4	 Recitals 3 and 4 of the preamble to the Distance Selling Directive (see footnote 2).
^5	  The alternative would be to justify the upholding of the mandatory withdrawal’s right in distance selling not through the efficiency rationale, but due to safety requirements, e.g., by ascertaining that consumers would be able to safely pay for purchased online goods. This would require, however, specific provisions guaranteeing consumers the reimbursement of the goods’ price if the goods are never delivered or deviate from the expected quality. For example, the consumer’s bank could be authorized to immediately cancel the payment to the trader upon a notification from the consumer that he withdraws from the contract. Currently, such measures are not in place, which does not point to consumers’ safety as a justification for the introduction of the right of withdrawal.
^6	  Art. 6 Distance Selling Directive (see footnote 2).
^7	  On other consequences of the withdrawal period’s prolongation see chapter 3.5. 
^8	  Art. 14 (2) Consumer Rights Directive (see footnote 3).
^9	  CJEU judgment of 3 September 2009, Pia Messner, C-489/07, ECR 2009 I-07315, Par. 19, 22-24. 
^10	  CJEU judgment of 3 September 2009, Pia Messner, C-489/07, ECR 2009 I-07315, Par. 26.
^11	  CJEU judgment of 3 September 2009, Pia Messner, C-489/07, ECR 2009 I-07315, Par. 27.
^12	  Rec. 47 Consumer Rights Directive (see footnote 3); AG Trstenjak opinion, Pia Messner, C-489/07, Par. 46-47.
^13	  See also: Art. 14 (2) Consumer Rights Directive (see footnote 3) and AG Trstenjak opinion, Pia Messner, C-489/07, Par. 52-54.
^14	  Many goods’ value deteriorates greatly upon a simple testing thereof. Ben-Shahar and Posner suggest that the withdrawal period’s length should be adjusted to the goods’ depreciation rate to allow consumers longer use of such goods that depreciate at a slower rate.
^15	  Of course, awarding a cooling-off period to consumers in any case implies that consumers need to pay the extra cost associated with the right of withdrawal, through the sales prices’ increase.
^16	  I am not comparing the emotional manipulation’s scale present in distance selling to that of other contracts, e.g., doorstep selling, but rather mentioning its existence that has been denied in other academic literature.
^17	  More on ‘cue utilisation theory’ see: Steenkamp 1989.
^18	  Even though the information asymmetry is also often present in offline shopping, the instant access to online information may widen the gap between the parties.
^19	  Obviously, any amount set as defining the consumer goods of little value would be arbitrary.
^20	  A recent report showed that only 35.4% of European consumers expressed their confidence about cross-border online shopping and that consumers were more likely to purchase online from national sellers (41%) rather than from those in other countries (11%) (European Commission 22.07.2013, pp. 4, 23). 
^21	  The second major obstacle to cross-border sales in the view of European retailers is a potentially higher risk resulting from fraud (European Commission 22.07.2013, p. 4). Consumers are 1.5 times more likely to buy goods online if they feel their rights are being protected/ respected (European Commission 22.07.2013, p. 41).
^22	  The reasoning behind this statement is that since e-consumers must own and be able to use new technologies, they tend to be younger, wealthier and better educated than traditional consumers. 
^23	  See footnote 4.
^24	  See next paragraph.
^25	  Art. 14 (2) Consumer Rights Directive (see footnote 3).
^26	  See also previous paragraphs on the endowment effect.
^27	  This will be further discussed in the next paragraph.
^28	  This would require a significant change of distance selling provisions, e.g., by adding options for the traders to collect the goods from consumers in case the transaction would not be confirmed. The transaction cost would be likely to raise, which could counterweigh the benefits of this approach.
^29	  Also described as confirmation bias or motivated reasoning.
^30	  Since consumers would have convinced themselves to be happy with the purchase, they would not feel any detriment personally, however, the market as a whole could be negatively affected, e.g., through misleading word-of-mouth.
^31	  Although, sometimes the procrastination effects are reduced in such a case.
^32	 Choi et al. suggested choosing a default that would be so bad that consumers would feel compelled to immediately opt out thereof.
^33	  And still, during the existing Consumer Acquis’ review consumer organisations argued for the cooling-off period’s prolongation to 14 working days (which would amount to ca. 3 weeks).
^34	  See footnote 4.
^35	  Unless the mechanisms of competition in the market bring the prices down again.
^36	  This will be further explained in the following paragraph.
^37	  This solution’s benefits would need to be weighed against the detriments of an increased choice paradox for consumers. See paragraph 3.6.
